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MEASURING THE DURATION OF JUDICIAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS: A COMMENT 
David P. Doane* 
Professors Clark and Merryman propose a useful indirect 
measure of the duration of litigation whose primary virtue is its ease 
of computation from published court data. As the authors note, such 
a measure of duration may be useful to persons involved in judicial 
administration and to attorneys formulating strategy in litigation, 1 and 
the legal community should find informative their illustration of the 
concept with Italian court data. Concluding on a pragmatic note, 
Professors Clark and Merryman appear to suggest that attorneys, 
clients, judges, court administrators, and social scientists must ulti-
mately assess the utility of their concept. 2 In making this assessment, 
we ought to consider several aspects of their proposal, including some 
underlying practical and .theoretical problems. Several of the appro-
priate caveats apply to all statistical rese~ch, while others are 
directed specifically to their concept of the duration of litigation 
@)).s 
There is no question that most court statistics published in this 
country are inadequate. The picture, however, is not as bleak as 
Professors Clark and Merryman seem to suggest. 4 Researchers do 
have access to fairly accurate data without archival research in a 
growing number of jurisdictions. The federal courts, for example, 
have for years published estimates of the duration of litigation, 
including median and mean statistics, broken down according to the 
type of case, the circuit, and even the district. 6 Also available are 
the "federal case weights,"11 compiled since 1964, which estimate the 
average number of judge-hours required to dispose of particular 
* Associate Professor of Economics, Oakland University. B.A. 1966, University 
of Kansas; Ph.D. 1969, Purdue University.-Ed. 
1. See Clark & Merryman, Measuring the Duration of Judicial and .Administrative 
Proceedings, 15 MICH. L. REV. 89, 89-90 & nn.1 & 2 (1976). 
2. See id. at 99. 
3. The variable D will be used specifically in reference to the measure of duration 
proposed by Professors Clark and Merryman. See id. at 92-95. 
4. See id. at 91-92 nn.10-11. 
5. These statistics have been available since the late 1960s. See U.S. ADMINIS• 
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 245i-245n 
246-84 (1970). A graphic example of the rapidity of -the changes in statisticai 
availability can be obtained by comparing the 1970 and 1973 Annual Reports. 
6. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 1969-1970 FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT TIMB 
STUDY 31 (1971). 
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types of cases. Of course, the federal system has been at the fore-
front both in the development of statistical reporting systems and 
centralized administrative planning, two goals which have so far 
eluded most state and municipal court systems. In fact, it is prob-
ably fair to say that the federal judicial system is about ten years 
ahead of the average state court system in statistical_ sophistication. 7 
The federal system's successful application of this statistical informa-
tion to a variety of tasks, however, has undoubtedly served as a 
powerful incentive for state and local courts to push for similar 
statistical capabilities. 
As Professors Clark and Merryman note, 8 California, Maryland, 
New Jersey, New York and a part of Pennsylvania publish mean or 
median statistics for the duration of litigation. To this list we may 
at least add Illinois, Michigan, and Utah, which according to the 
National Center for State Courts (Center), also compile and publish 
such statistics. 9 Significantly, these states together include approxi-
mately one third of the population of the United States. Further, 
at least twenty-five to thirty states regularly submit annual reports 
to the Center that include statistics comparable to those compiled by 
Professors Clark and Merryman for Italian courts. 10 An indirect 
measure of the duration of litigation may be derived from this data. 
It is considerably more difficult to determine the statistical sophistica-
tion of the local court systems. However, the District of Columbia, 
New York City, Los Angeles, and other California cities publish 
mean and median statistics that, if not superior, are at least compar-
able in sophistication to those statistics of the more advanced states. 
Standardized statistical reporting must be a first priority for state 
and local judicial systems since it is a sine qua non for modernization. 
In addition, since the qost effectiveness of such reporting systems has 
been widely demonstrated, it is reasonable to predict -that within a 
few years all but the smallest courts will be able to afford to publish 
high-quality statistics. The national Center for State Courts and the 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) are now 
sponsoring projects to speed the modernization of information sys-
tems and to improve comparability of statistics among jurisdictions: 
7. See, e.g., U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. CoURTS, supra note 1; 
U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR 
UNITED STATES CoURTS (1973). 
8. See Clark & Merryman, supra note 1, at 92 n.10. 
9. See Court Case Weights Using the Delphi Method: Report on an Experi-
ment in the Michigan Circuit Courts, paper presented by D. Doane at Joint National 
Meeting, Operations Research Society of America and The Institute of Management 
Sciences, Nov. 3, 1976, Miami Beach, Fla. [hereinafter Doane Paper] on file at 
Michigan Law Review. 
10. See id. 
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Of greater potential for the courts themselves, though its fruition is 
likely ten years away, is LEAA's Standard Judicial Information Sys-
tem Project. With [pilot projects] now operating in eleven states, 
[this project] is a truly major effort to develop the basic information 
systems needed for court management at the state level. Changing 
technology . . . makes possible the development of similar decen-
tralized but compatible systems even in small courts.11 
Thus, the inadequacy of most state and local court statistics is a 
diminishing, if still troublesome, problem. 
If, however, published data in a particular jurisdiction do not 
include direct measures of duration of litigation, it is necessary to 
use an indirect measure. Before adopting any particular estimate 
of the duration of litigation, such as the equation for index D offered 
by Professors Clark and Merryman, it is helpful to recognize the 
limits of its statistical validity and its proper applications. For 
instance, the index D is a proxy variable whose theoretical properties 
are uncertain. It should not be regarded as a substitute for a mean 
or median statistic, since it does not closely resemble either one. It 
is correct, as Professor Clark and Merryman claim, 12 that D will prob-
ably more closely approximate the mean than the median. Even a 
high correlation between D and the median duration, however, does 
not establish that D is a "good" alternative, except in the limited 
sense that both measures tend to vary in the same direction. More-
over, a high degree of correlation (R2 = 0.54) 13 does not necessarily 
have much practical significance to an individual litigant. The at-
tempt to relate D to the mean or median seems to be a digression 
from the main argument. It is sufficient to say that D is simply one 
possible "measure of central tendency,"14 and then to identify its 
more important features, including its limitations. 
It is first important to recognize that D is really just the ratio of 
ending inventory to withdrawn and adjudicated cases. It is not an 
annual input-output ratio as Professors Clark and Merryman claim, 
but rather a stock-flow ratio. Roughly speaking, D is the inverse of 
what accountants call the "inventory turnover ratio," a widely used 
management tool.15 This fact may help some readers recognize the 
essential simplicity and possible uses of D statistics. 
Second, D is unable to offer a good measure of a court's capacity 
to deliver judgments, assumed to be equivalent to the number of trials. 
11. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1975). 
12. See Clark & Merryman, supra note 1, at 95 n.18. 
13. Id. 
14. A measure of central tendency is a s~tistic that reduces a large body of data 
to a single term, such as a mean, median, or mode. 
15. See G. WELSCH, C. ZLATKOVITCH & J. WHITE, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 
1046 (1972). 
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This criticism focuses on the use of D as a measure of the efficiency of 
a court. Illustratively, suppose that during a given year 500 final 
judgments have been rendered (J) and 500 cases have been with-





we find that by plugging in our illustrative statistics, 
1,000 
D =----- 1 
500+500 
which Professors Clark and Merryman interpret to mean that, on the 
average, it will take one year to decide a newly filed case in the sub-
sequent year. However, given our court's illustrative work rate and 
assuming cases are decided in order of filing, if all cases were actu-
ally brought to trial it would, in fact, take two years for the court 
to work its way down the queue to a newly filed case. The capacity 
of our court to adjudicate cases, therefore, is better reflected by 




Third, -the D index probably would not be helpful in assigning 
cases and staffing courts and administrative tribunals. The primary 
virtue of the D statistic is its ease of computation. However, the 
proper allocation of judicial resources requires a more specialized 
statistical tool, and the most promising developments in this area 
involve refinements of the case-weight statistics already fashioned 
for the federal courts.17 Case weights are designed to reflect the 
resource demands imposed by different types of cases. An index 
of duration is but one measure of the- demands. The issues now 
being discussed in connection with case-weight estimation have re-
vealed many difficulties that prohibit the cavalier use of an indirect 
measure of duration to allocate judicial resources.18 
16. See DonVito, An Experiment in the Use of Court Statistics, 56 JUD. 56 
(1972). The individual. litigant, however, is not interested solely in the court's 
capacity to render judgments. The number of cases withdrawn has an important 
Pt 
effect on his behavior. Thus, for his purposes the formula -- may be superior 
J+W 
Pt 
to DonVito's -. 
J 
11. See text at note 6 supra. 
18. See Doane Paper, supra note 9. 
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Finally, a potential problem exists in determining what judicial 
action ought to be considered a separate "case" for purposes of 
measurement. This is important since the definition of a case, which 
underlies the measurement of all the variables in the equation for 
D, appears to vary among jurisdictions. For example, some courts 
may count litigation involving multiple defendants as several cases, 
equating the number of cases with the number of codefendants in 
the complaint. This practice is generally at odds with the standard 
accounting practice, but it illustrates the potential for disparity. 
Similarly, some courts count as separate cases court actions that 
follow up previously tried cases, such as those to enforce judgments 
or determine probation violations, and those involving matters on 
remand from appellate courts, while other court systems do not.10 
The importance of this can be understood by considering equation 
(5) proposed by Professors Clark and Merryman.20 Assuming this 
ratio is less than one, if a jurisdiction adopts a liberal definition of 
what action is a "case," its D index would be larger than if the same 
jurisdiction more conservatively counted cases. A similar result 
would follow if two different jurisdictions adopted different account-
ing definitions. Thus, D has only limited validity for comparisons 
among jurisdictions until statistical reporting is standardized. 
One general word of warning must be voiced regarding the 
general limitations of statistical methods. Professors Clark and 
Merryman imply that in order to predict we must reduce data to a 
single, summary term, such as the mean, median, or modal dura-
tion. 21 It is true that one of the statistician's duties is to collapse 
unwieldy arrays of observed data into a single statistic to comprehend 
more easily properties of the phenomenon under observation. There 
are, however, two reasons why information reduction alone does not 
permit us to predict accurately an individual event. 
The first reason is that the next case to be filed must be assumed 
to be as variable as the original array of observations. There can 
be no appeal to the law of large numbers when dealing with a single 
case. Almost by definition, statistical averages should only be used 
for broad scale planning since the power of statistics lies more in 
identifying general characteristics than in predicting specific events. 
The second reason is best considered by reference to an illustra-
tion. Let us consider, for example, two courts, A and B, whose dis-
tributions of case processing times for the same types of cases vary 
19. See id. 
20. See Clark & Merryman, supra note 1, at 94. 
21. Id. at 92. 
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as shown in Figure 1 and are skewed to the right as Professors 





Key: lower axis measures duration of litigation and shaded area 
represents extent of overlap 
The mean duration for court B exceeds that for court A, but since 
the variations in time for the two courts are so large,· the distributions 
overlap to a significant degree. In other words, the observed dif-
ference in means, although statistically significant, may have little 
practical significance for litigants making short-run, individual de-
cisions. Practitioners will perhaps find it easy to accept the a priori 
argument that the variation in time is indeed large. 
As a final consideration, it is clear that the average duration of 
litigation is partly a result of conscious strategic actions by attorneys 
and other decision-makers. It is too simplistic to assume that time 
impinges only as an exogenous constraint in the model of litigant 
decision-making. Much work remains if we are to construct new 
theoretical formulations of behavior that are both logically and 
empirically appropriate for application. · Despite the pragmatic 
nature of their article, Professors Clark and Merryman do their part 
to identify relevant underlying issues. This is a characteristic of 
good empirical research: It brings trouble spots into sharp focus and 
swells the queue of unanswered theoretical questions. Professors 
Clark and Merryman have taken an important step in formulating 
a basic vocabulary of working concepts and indicators to be used by 
researchers. The next steps belong to the model builders. 23 
22. Id. at 95 n.18. 
23. The best behavioral modeling may be found in the utility-maximization ap-
proach, see Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. LAw & EcoN. 61 
(1971), and the systems-descriptive Markov models. See Blumstein, Management 
Science to Aid the Manager, 15 SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 35 {Fall, 1973). 
